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ABSTRACT
Data from network devices is commonly made available without any regard to, or
concern, for the ability to provably verify the classification level of the involved data. The
owner of a network device frequently will wish to restrict data access, visibility, and
processing as a policy action. To address these types of challenges, techniques presented
herein support a multi-step approach to addressing the issue of how owners of network
device-generated data may share such data with other parties (e.g., a vendor’s technical
assistance center, partners, etc.) in a controlled way that respects data and other privacy
controls and provides verification of the integrity of the data. The presented techniques
support, among other things, parsing, objectifying, classifying, verifying, and, optionally,
encrypting multiple elements of network device-generated data streams and attaching the
output of such a process as verifiable metadata that is associated with the various network
data objects thus generated.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Today, data from network devices is made available and exported without any
regard to, or concern for the ability to provably verify, the classification level of the
involved data – such as, for example, privacy levels, the presence of personally identifiable
information (PII) in a data stream, data sovereignty restrictions that may be applicable, etc.
Such devices generate different types of data and that data may be consumed by a
range of applications, and, in some instance, different groups of engineers, for various
reasons. For example, data such as a ‘show tech’ from a network device, packet captures
(e.g., PCAP files) from a device, records encompassing Internet Protocol (IP) traffic flows
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that are traversing a device and which are exported to a central location, and logging (e.g.,
syslog) messages, among other examples, all contain varying amounts of PII data and/or
other data which for a variety of reasons (even beyond PII) are collected and exchanged
with a vendor’s technical assistance center engineers for troubleshooting purposes. On the
other hand, streaming telemetry data from the devices may be consumed by different
vendor-developed or certified applications, or customer home-grown open-source
applications, for analytics, visualization, or optimization purposes.

Such network-

generated data may comprise varying levels of granular information that could be
employed by malicious users to gain business or infrastructure insight (e.g., how a site is
connected, the number of internal subnets, etc.) or discover details about potential attack
vectors (e.g., allowed ports, enabled features, software version, etc. and the associated
vulnerabilities). A data owner may wish to restrict various of the above as a policy action.
However, without the ability to properly segment the data streams, classify the
segments, and provide provable integrity for the data segments and elements involved – all
capabilities that are lacking today in network devices – no follow-on policies can be safely
and comprehensively implemented.
To address these types of challenges, techniques are presented herein that support,
among other things, methods to objectize network-generated data streams, classify such
data object 'chunks' into varying levels of privacy (based on a ring-oriented scheme), attach
metadata to each sub-objectized data block or chunk, verify that the data objects have not
been tampered with (either in transit or at rest) thus ensuring data integrity, and finally
leverage the above to apply different policies to control, for example, data access, visibility,
and processing.
In brief, aspects of the techniques presented herein form the basis for follow-on
organizational and supra-organizational policies regarding who can access data – along
with options for where, when, why, etc. – thus achieving an organization's goals of
controlling access to the network device data that the organization generates and shares.
For example, an organization may elect to share network data with a vendor’s technical
assistance center, or with a partner, for the purposes of troubleshooting.
Various of the techniques presented herein support a method and proposed
apparatus for network device data objectivization, classification, and verification, for the
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purposes of enabling appropriate data privacy controls, using verified ring-oriented
metadata that is attached to the original data stream.
Aspects of the techniques presented herein support a multi-step approach to solving
the issue of how owners of network device-generated data may share such data with other
parties (e.g., a vendor’s technical assistance center, partners, etc.) in a controlled way that
respects PII and other privacy controls and provides verification of the integrity of the data.
Considering the above, aspects of the techniques presented herein may be
explicated with the help of an illustrative example which captures the techniques’ basic
approach. Such an illustrative example is presented in the narrative below.
To begin the illustrative example, consider that network data is generated by a
network device. This may include, for example, ‘show tech’ output, ‘show run’ output,
records encompassing IP traffic flows that are traversing a device, logging (e.g., syslog)
messages, or other network device-generated data streams.
The generated data streams may be directed from the source device (e.g., a vendorsupplied switch, router, etc.) into a containerized application that is running on the device
(e.g., running within a ‘guest shell’ under a device’s operating system (OS)).

A

containerized application is used in the instant example as just one possible approach (e.g.,
providing a faster time-to-market for aspects of the techniques presented herein by
avoiding the need to code changes to the OS base on the device to implement the below
described functionality). However, conceptually this would be identical if the base OS on
the device also directly provided the below described functionality.
The containerized application (which for simplicity of exposition may be referred
to as a Network Data Objectivization and Classification (or NDOC) engine) performs a
number of functions on the network data stream that is sent to the NDOC engine. Those
functions are described in the narrative below.
The NDOC engine parses an incoming data stream and chunks the data into various
‘objects,’ with each object corresponding to an element over which differentiated control
may later be desired. For example, in a ‘show run’ output objects may include the
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) portion of the configuration, the
routing portion, the various interface configurations, etc. It is important to note that objects
can be, and most often would be, granular all the way down to individual data items such
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as IP addresses, port numbers, AS designations, etc. Objectification is not limited to the
section level. This allows for, as an example, an interface-level configuration to later be
reviewed but to retain control over viewing or use of the IP addresses involved.
The NDOC engine assigns each object that is parsed within the network data stream
to a classification level based on a defined ring structure, where Ring 0 is the most private
and leading out to Ring 'N' being the least private. A minimum of three ring levels would
typically be defined for network data streams (supporting highest privacy, medium privacy,
and lowest privacy), but additional rings may be defined and used, if needed. The decision
as to which elements within an incoming network data set would be attached to which
privacy or security classification level is driven by a rules-based engine that is resident
within the NDOC. A network device administrator is able to override such a classification
level and assign, either temporarily or permanently, a different level if desired. For
example, if an administrator determined that for some reason certain data elements that
normally reside at Ring 1 should be reclassified to Ring 0, at any point in time they could
make such a designation.
The NDOC engine leverages an on-device ‘trusted anchor’ module (TaM) (e.g., an
on-device hardware-anchored immutable basis for a trust chain) to digitally sign each
network data object that is generated. This accomplishes two things. First, it guarantees
that the network data in fact originated from the origin device that it claims to have
originated from. Second, it verifies that this network data object, when it is later reviewed,
has not been tampered with, either while it was in-flight or while it was at-rest.
Additionally, the NDOC may attach other metadata to the objects to provide a contextual
description of where the data originated. For example, this may include an identifier in the
networking device describing the country, state, province, federal agency, etc. where the
device is used.
The NDOC engine attaches the metadata (e.g., the classification ring level and the
associated network data object, the ring level digital signature, the contextual information,
etc.) to each and every network data object element. Optionally, the NDOC engine can
encrypt the resulting fleshed-out network object to provide data obfuscation, if desired.
Note that some network data objects so produced could be encrypted, while others might
not be encrypted. If encryption is used, the encryption keys may be controlled by the
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network data source (typically the owner of the network device) and may be provided to
the remote possible end-user of the network data object (for example, to a vendor’s
technical assistance center or to a partner) via an appropriate key distribution method. In
this way, the network device owner (typically the customer) can then revoke the keys if
needed, disallowing access to the data (even when the data is held remotely) by denying
the ability to decrypt it.
Finally, to complete the illustrative example, the NDOC engine exports from the
network device the resulting objectivized, classified, and verified (and, optionally, fully or
partially encrypted) data elements for off-box processing and use.
Off-box devices may now use the object-based, classified, and verified series of
data elements as they see fit. For example, policies may be put into place such that, for
example, a vendor’s technical assistance center is able to view and use all Ring 1+ data but
Ring 0 data (such as, for example, passwords, designated IP addresses, etc.) would be
restricted, an analytics engine processing the network device data might only be allowed
Ring 2+ access, and a trusted network administrator might be allowed Ring 0 access.
It is important to note that while rings often may be concentric (i.e., having Ring 0
access implies having access to all of the rings above it, having Ring 2 access implies denial
of the rings below it, etc.), another (e.g., more flexible) access model could also be
instantiated that could allow differentiated access on a per-user or per-group basis (i.e., to
override or constrain the ring-based access method, as needed or desired).
A customer may also stipulate policies that examine other contextual elements of
the metadata in the data objects, such as preventing certain types of data from being stored
outside of a data sovereignty region (e.g., a U.S. federal agency router producing data could
have identifiers preventing a vendor’s technical assistance center from storing those files
outside of the United States).
Figure 1, below, depicts how network data may be objectized with different
metadata policies to control the consumption by different parties according to aspects of
the techniques presented herein.

5
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2021

6656
6

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 4483 [2021]

Figure 1: Illustrative Ring-based Network Data Objectivization
Figure 2, below, presents a very simple example of how a ‘show output’ may be
objectivized with additional metadata according to aspects of the techniques presented
herein. For brevity, just the security level is highlighted and a JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) format is employed. However, such brevity does not imply any implementation
decisions or limitations.

Figure 2: Exemplary Network Data Objectivization
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The example from Figure 2, above, employs an inventory model and depicts the
association of different security levels for different data. The output could always be
generated as a binary file and so depending upon the security clearance of the user who is
reading the file the relevant objects may be composed together. For example, a user with
maximum security clearance could see the serial number (i.e., SN) in the above output
while a user from a partner may just see the chassis name (i.e., NAME).
To briefly summarize the above discussion, the techniques presented herein support
a novel method and propose an apparatus for parsing, objectifying, classifying, verifying,
and optionally encrypting multiple elements of network device-generated data streams and
attaching the output of such a process as verifiable metadata that is associated with the
various network data objects so generated. Such capabilities do not exist in network
devices, or in the industry, today.
While some of the elements that are found under the techniques presented herein
(such as the different data elements involved and an on-device ‘trusted anchor’ module in
network devices) have been available for some time, no current solution exists as a whole
according to the techniques presented herein – i.e., network device-generated data being
objectified, classified, and verified with such processing then used to tag verifiable
metadata onto the resulting network data objects for the purposes of controlling off-box
network data element usage, distribution, and policy-based controls.
In particular, aspects of the techniques presented herein focus on chunking the
desired data into objects, attaching metadata tags that allow each chunk of data to be
associated with a given level of data sovereignty, and ensuring that the integrity of the data
chunks is not tampered with – for all aspects of network device-generated data.
This includes not just configuration files from devices but also data sets that are
generated by network devices such as records encompassing IP traffic flows that are
traversing a device, logging (e.g., syslog) messages, or other network device-generated
data streams, all of which are provided today in a ‘flatter’ format without any associated
metadata tags or classification information that may be used to support data sovereignty
efforts. In contrast, techniques herein provide for the ability to segment, metadata-label,
and secure all aspects of network-device-generated data with an eye to using these
chunking, classification, and signing capabilities in support of data sovereignty efforts.
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Additionally, the techniques presented herein attach a digital signature to any and
all such device-generated data and metadata, anchored into the immutable on-device
‘trusted anchor’ module within the device, to ensure that the data and metadata has not
been tampered with in transit or at rest. Such an approach is important considering that
policies surrounding access to the data will be based on the attached metadata
classifications and the data sovereignty levels that they imply. This is an important
consideration given the absence of such capabilities in today’s ‘flat’ and non-chunked
device-generated data sets.
It is important to note that a customer cannot control how their data is accessed or
handled by partners, a vendor’s technical assistance center, or others once the data is out
of their device or domain. Consequently, it is the application of the chunking, metadata
attachment, and digital verification capabilities to all aspects of device-generated data that
is a key to the techniques presented herein.
Due to the need to apply complex data sovereignty rules to network devicegenerated data, the techniques presented herein add an important new capability to a
vendor’s network devices and can serve as a critical differentiator between the vendor and
other vendors’ devices when it comes to the critical area of data sovereignty and control
for all aspects of network device-generated data streams.
As the metadata that is attached to each chunk of network-device data is key – that
metadata can be used subsequently in many different ways for data sovereignty purposes
– it should be noted that under the flexible techniques presented herein that metadata may
be generated in several unique ways. For example, the metadata that is attached to a chunk
of network device-generated data may be based on a combination of not only the ring level
but also the context of where a device is located (e.g., is it a core device vs. an access device
vs. a firewall, etc.). In this way, the ring level for the metadata may be dynamically defined
based on the device's role, position within the network, or other factors. Such a capability
does not exist today. Additionally, concerning the use of the metadata, rather than having
a static set of rules that define what data and data types are associated to which ring level
as a classifier, at each ring level a machine learning (ML) classifier may be used that takes
a series of inputs from the associated data stream and subsequently determines the best ring
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level for all or a portion of the involved network device-generated data. Such a capability
does not exist in the industry today.
Use of the techniques presented herein offers clear visibility. For example, use may
be concluded if it is observed that network device data that is being generated (either
directly or via an adjunct element such as an on-box or off-box container) contains a
segmented, objectivized version of the network device data, tagged with metadata
concerning classification levels, and verified by a digital signature or similar mechanism
to avoid data tampering.
The techniques presented herein will be extremely useful for any entity wishing to,
or needing to, control access to their network device generated data once that data leaves
the network device. The classification (using a ring-based metadata system) provides a
flexible method of network device data classification and integrity verification, upon which
a separate but associated policy infrastructure for appropriate data access may be created.
A customer subject to data sharing restrictions (organizational, geographical, or otherwise)
will find the techniques presented herein particularly useful.
In summary, techniques have been presented herein that support a multi-step
approach to solving the issue of how owners of network device-generated data may share
such data with other parties (e.g., a vendor’s technical assistance center, partners, etc.) in a
controlled way that respects data and other privacy controls and provides verification of
the integrity of the data. The presented techniques support, among other things, parsing,
objectifying, classifying, verifying, and optionally encrypting multiple elements of
network device-generated data streams and attaching the output of such a process as
verifiable metadata that is associated with the various network data objects thus generated.
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